


Strategy Research Project

Command Clairvoyance: Strategically Transforming AFRC Through Total Force and Leadership

by

Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. Thode
United States Air Force Reserve



United States Army War College
Class of 2012

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**COMMAND CLAIRVOYANCE: STRATEGICALLY TRANSFORMING AFRC
THROUGH TOTAL FORCE AND LEADERSHIP**

by

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ABSTRACT

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Predicated upon an environment of fiscal restraint and stewardship, the Air Force enterprise will be required to leverage synergies through transformation. Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) potentially proves to be a highly cost effective solution, especially through the venue of Total Force Initiative (TFI). Yet, examining the cultural premises and educational requirements of TFI yields intriguing results; mainly that *TFI-related education is fundamentally lacking*. This paper proposes possible remedies as well as relevant topics that AFRC leadership should consider when refining its vision and mission. AFRC should entertain a litany of strategically introspective questions focusing on utilization of the continuum of service, career cross-pollination, the creation of a strategic initiative group, and empowering and developing a culture based on leadership. As with any strategic level organizational transformation, success and failure hinge upon the lynchpin of leadership to imbue and endorse the change. Hence, fostering cross-culturally savvy leadership with *coup d'oeil* is quintessential to success. The subject matter of this paper can be levied as a proposed CORONA topic from AFRC.

COMMAND CLAIRVOYANCE: STRATEGICALLY TRANSFORMING AFRC THROUGH TOTAL FORCE AND LEADERSHIP

Senior leaders manage transformation.

—General Martin Dempsey¹

Based on the supposition that transformational organizational change is often a bifurcated path, with change either occurring incrementally through a gradual realization of cultural evolution and necessity, or that transformational organizational change is kindled by a significant catalyst that galvanizes awareness in order to motivate change, the author developed a variegated list of potential actions that Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) should consider to best adapt to the changing geopolitical landscape.^{2,3,4} Preemptively implementing many of these changes will best position AFRC to avoid an external catalyst from dictating other unwanted-and perhaps draconian-changes. Due to the nature of “bureaucratic inertia,” the author advocates examination of all these subjects simultaneously, based on the fact that the viability of implementing these options will be driven by a multitude of factors.^{5,6} Hence, the multifarious options listed, along with multifaceted approaches, will enable AFRC leadership to choose the options most conducive to the enterprise’s vision and mission, and perhaps contribute to refining the vision and mission to reflect the dynamic domestic and international domains within which AFRC operates.⁷ Moreover, these recommended changes will add utility not just to AFRC, but to the Active Duty Air Force, the Air Reserve Component (ARC), our sister services, and ideally to our nation’s ability to “fight and win” wars.⁸

This treatise defines national level desiderata that guide AFRC toward pursuing options to optimize its contributions-in conjunction with the Air Force-to the Total Force

Enterprise (TFE). This monograph's primary focus is based upon examining AFRC through the lens of the Total Force Initiative (TFI) and identifying ways to find synergy and leverage to maximize the return on investment for American taxpayers. Starting from national strategic guidance, TFI is reevaluated to examine some existing shortfalls, and offer remedies that focus on education, culture, and leadership. Other organizational adaptations such as career cross-pollination, continuum of service, and the creation of a Strategic Initiatives Group (SIG) are nominated and addressed for feasibility and significance of potential contributions to AFRC. The conglomeration of topics shares the common thread of organizational transformation, and hinges on the need for visionary leadership to clearly discern precise methods of implementation.

The Need for Change

The fiscal impetus for transformational change was clearly framed by the previous Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, in two key statements. "Let me be clear, the task before us is not to reduce the department's top line budget. Rather, it is to significantly reduce its excess overhead costs and apply the savings to force structure and modernization."⁹ By coupling this comment by Secretary Gates with his comments on the Total Force, AFRC has some relatively clear guidance from the National strategic level, "The Congress, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, and the Department all recognize that the National Guard and the Reserves are integral to the Total Force and have assumed a greater operational role in today's force."¹⁰ Marrying these two comments together, one can infer that the United States military needs to save money, and that the National Guard and Reserves are cost effective enabling mediums. The same themes resonate from the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).¹¹ This continuity was echoed by the current Secretary of

Defense, Leon Panetta, who testified before the House Armed Services Committee and stated, "Our challenge is taking a force that has been involved in a decade of war and ensuring that we build the military we need to defend our country for the next decade even at a time of fiscal austerity."¹² It thus behooves these military services to transform as required to effectively meet these national priorities.

From the institutional Air Force level, *The CSAF Vector*, July 4, 2010 articulates not only a vector, but more importantly the Chief of Staff of the Air Force's (CSAF) strategic vision on where the Air Force enterprise needs to go. It initially established the USAF's five priorities that are the foundation of all programming:

Some of the programs outlined above are already in progress, some require implementation, and *all require leadership and fresh thinking*. We cannot know what the future holds, so in order to realize my vision of a consistently powerful, capable Air Force, we will almost certainly need to pursue initiatives not yet fully imagined.¹³

The CSAF updated this vector in July, 2011, reiterating the budgetary constraints:

In the coming years our Nation and our Air Force will face a budget environment unlike anything we have encountered in decades. As elected officials consider what to do about the growing federal debt, pressure will mount to reduce defense spending...We must move ahead, continually sustaining and renewing the Air Force's unique, asymmetric, and vital contributions to national security.¹⁴

Hence, AFRC has delineated guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the CSAF that meld two key transformational pillars together: transformation and fiscal austerity. AFRC leadership has realized that the vector and the vision are the thread of continuity that should ideally be interwoven throughout the Air Force and Air Force Reserve corporate processes. Additionally, AFRC has established continuity between its priorities, linking them to Air Force priorities, which are aligned with OSD guidance and integrated into the programming process. Continuing on its vector, AFRC

needs to continue to align its priorities with the same reference datum provided in the CSAF guidance. AFRC must rely on its collective perspicacity to refine its vision of TFI and redefine the relationship to the Air Force priorities. AFRC needs to tailor its mission diversification to be in line with likely mission expansion in a manner that complements the Air Force. AFRC leadership is well aware of change being the backstop for 21st century operations. Lieutenant General Charles Stenner, Chief of the Air Force Reserve, encapsulated this by stating, "The Air Force is changing, and the Air Force Reserve is going to change with it."¹⁵

TFI is now an operational paradigm inherent to Air Force and ARC culture, and it is a venue that requires the Air Force and AFRC to change in unison, as General Stenner acknowledged:

The Air Force is under the same pressures the rest of our services are under. We are not going to look the same as we look today. We are probably not going to be as big, but we do have to be as powerful. We cannot be a hollow force. Our leadership has made that very clear. We are going to do what we need to do for this nation in a very good manner and be ready and not be hollow, but that takes (commitment from) all three components [Active, Guard, and Reserve] working together seamlessly.

TFI is flourishing. These equal partner associate units honor the Citizen Airmen model by respecting the differences between the three Air Force components while capitalizing on their various strengths. TFI is the major reason for our continued success.¹⁶

More than likely any new AFRC missions will feature the synchronization and fusion with Active Duty personnel. With 45 programmed TFI Part 1 initiatives, four CSAF Part 2 initiatives, and 14 proposed future TFI initiatives, it absolutely behooves AFRC to do its absolute best to optimize TFI.¹⁷ AFRC, the Active Duty Air Force, and both Program Objective Memorandum (POM) processes share a symbiotic relationship centered on TFI. Getting TFI "right" will leverage both the Active Duty Air Force and

AFRC. Based on the reality that TFI already comprises the majority of AFRC operations in varying degrees, it is quite obvious that improving TFI synergies and efficiencies will directly contribute to the aforementioned national and institutional objectives. TFI is the primary focal point for transformation. Moreover, there are some facets of TFI that need polishing to realize TFI's full potential.

TFI Background

Due to the scope of this paper, a fundamental and conceptual understanding of the Air Force, ARC, TFI, classic, and active associations is assumed. This section's primary focus will be on AFRC's involvement in Combat Air Force (CAF) TFI, although logical corollaries may also be applicable to the Mobility Air Force (MAF) TFI. The localized shortfalls of CAF TFI essentially dovetail into organizational transformation, and the importance of developing and communicating a vision.¹⁸ Nowhere is this more apparent than in *Air Force Instruction (AFI) 90-1001, Responsibilities for Total Force Integration*. Although the instruction does state "background, applicability, objectives, and strategic vision," the subject matter is so bureaucratically obfuscated by the labyrinthine document that very little message resonates about the true strategic focus.¹⁹ There is a definite difference between communicating a vision and promulgating an AFI. Unfortunately, much of Air Force and AFRC leadership has been charged with leading organizations with a somewhat unclear understanding of the broader vision, especially as it is tailored to their particular wing via their major command (MAJCOM). This is in turn magnified by *AFI 90-1001* discussing how each unit will have a *different* Integration Plan (I-PLAN), Concept of Operations (CONOP), Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs).²⁰ In the below block quote, notice the accentuation of the fact that TFI will be different. Is TFI

chameleon-like; moreover, is it capable of correctly adapting to all environments and circumstances? Will its successes be broad-based, or driven by leadership and culture at the wing level and below?

Strategic Vision: While the specific strategic goal for Total Force Integration will be somewhat *different* for each USAF air and ground weapon system, the strategic vision remains focused on an expeditionary mindset and the desire to maintain the highest levels of force readiness while sustaining the maximum capability to the warfighter. Toward this end, MAJCOM developed long range positions for the Total Force will be integrated into the Air Force Strategic Plan and will clearly articulate future Total Force goals and objectives for the Air Force.²¹

It is very difficult to articulate a vision that goes in multiple directions, and as soon as the word “different” is utilized, the vision connotatively becomes open to varying interpretations. Additionally, each empowered MAJCOM may have its own “vision on the vision.” Although well intentioned, this relatively vague and nebulous vision allows for multiple and sometimes disparate interpretations of leadership duties associated with TFI, and serves as a source of conflict. This is a strategic problem that permeates portions of TFI culture from the headquarters Air Force level to the MAJCOM, to the wing, to the group, to the squadron, and down to the individual airmen. These “different” realms of TFI implicitly delegate leadership oversight and responsibility to the wing level. Thus, predicated upon TFI taking different forms, the broad-based success of TFI depends on collective leadership at the wing level and below.²² In subsequent sections this paper will address the importance of key leaders at the wing level and below and their requirement to influence organizational culture. By reading the excerpt on the objective of TFI, similar and compounding issues will arise.

Objective: The objective of the Total Force Integration program is to meet Air Force operational mission requirements by aligning equipment, missions, infrastructure, and manpower resources within the Air Force to enable a more effective and efficient use of these assets. The key

requirement is to ensure that the Air Force maintains the capability to meet combatant commander (CCDR) requirements for both surge and sustained operations. Current operations tempo, personnel tempo, dwell time, crew ratios, and a shrinking pool of resources require that we seek ways to form more Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard partnerships. By realigning the Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and/or Air National Guard resources and missions with a focus on combat efficiencies and the “greater good,” these new organizational constructs and missions with a focus on capability will allow Air Force organizations to continue to meet their responsibilities and commitments. Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard and Regular Air Force commanders must ensure that all personnel are familiar with these concepts and objectives.²³

In a similar manner, this block quotation mentions a litany of organizations and requirements, many of which may have inherently diametrically opposing objectives.

There is a wise use of the word “alignment” in context. However, initial I-Plans failed to tailor some of the “equipment, missions, infrastructure, and manpower resources” to be commensurate with Unit Type Code (UTC), Unit Manning Document (UMD), War Mobilization Plans (WMP), crew ratios, and Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) constructs.

This later compounded into issues that would manifest in Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), AEF Reporting Tool (ART), and Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), especially for the ARC. These issues comprehensively affected CAF TFI wings.²⁴ Fundamental to this lack of alignment were assumptions that Active Duty Air Force, Air National Guardsmen, and Air Force Reservists were mathematically interchangeable at predetermined ratios.²⁵ Unfortunately, no organization with a human dynamic can be adequately reduced to equations. This issue still poses one of the largest obstacles between a wing commander’s operationalized TFI and a MAJCOM programmer’s vision of TFI. TFI was already implemented but it needed adjustment, requiring communication between wing

commanders and their respective MAJCOMs, as well as between affected MAJCOMs. Nurturing relationships requires perseverance and attention.

The nature of these relationships starts at the top of the enterprise. Air Force Strategic Leaders, starting with the CSAF and the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) have made reinvigorating TFI a focus area, and reiterated TFI's importance multiple times in their 2012 Posture Statement.²⁶ Fortunately this goaded other MAJCOMs to revitalize their TFI focus. Air Combat Command (ACC) realized the CAF's deficiency and began to address some of the program's inadequacies via the "TFI Tiger Team."²⁷ ACC and the ARC each had epiphanies tied to the fact that organizational divisions needed to be aligned commensurate with existing UTCs. Resolution won't be simple because current UMDs aren't in alignment with this construct. However, involved MAJCOMs are working to resolve this issue.²⁸

Due to TFI being focused on the expeditionary mindset, much of the Active Duty scrutiny of TFI I-Plans and CONOPs focuses on the concept of volunteerism instead of mobilization, and ties into ARC culture.²⁹ Unfortunately, the concept is relatively easy to misconstrue without detailed examination of legislation. This subject matter is beyond the scope of this essay; however, it is this author's opinion that AFRC should forgo writing assumed volunteerism percentages into any TFI documents because AFRC is often held to these misconstrued and arbitrary numbers by Active Duty perception.³⁰ Unfortunately, this relatively opaque guidance, when viewed through the lens of different cultures, has created a few TFI apostates who no longer endeavor to make TFI work.

These TFI iconoclasts in turn represent a cultural undercurrent that is a major impediment to TFI success from either the host unit or tenant unit perspective. There is a causal linkage to the fact that the TFI endeavor left its port without being adequately resourced or equipped in some instances. Cultural resistance to TFI is apparent from both the Active Duty and the ARC. Resistance from the ARC is often due to the heritage and legacy of units and the longer duration of personnel, some of whom are entrenched in a previous paradigm. Breaking this vestigial cultural resistance is a major obstacle that is best accomplished through proper selection of wing leadership and below for both the Active Duty and the ARC.³¹ Resistance from the Active Duty often emanates from a lack of understanding and education on Reserve culture.

The author acknowledges that perceived success in the TFI domain, although subjective, varies significantly from the MAF to the CAF. This goes back to the topic of organizational transformation. AFRC associations have been integrated into the MAF since 1968, and have had multiple generations of cultural evolution since that time.³² TFI in the CAF essentially started with the late 1990's Fighter Associate Program (FAP), and is iteratively progressing toward TFI as portions of the FAP program sunset.³³ The emergence of CAF TFI has been coincident with a significant reduction in the CAF, resulting in competition that further complicates the issue. The author intends to highlight the temporal difference between the MAF, without assigning causality. Acculturation and assimilation into a cohesive operation occurs with cultural turnover.³⁴ Cultural change takes time, leadership, vision, and action. Oliver Recklies states:

In summary, the rules for cultural implementation of a merger [are] as follows: To impose an unwanted culture is a good solution in very few cases. *Integrating cultures are much harder to achieve; however, in the long term they promise much better results.*

Leadership Meets and Molds Culture

As previously alluded to, the success of TFI hinges on personalities which pivot on leadership and understanding culture. It is very difficult to accurately lead and navigate without a holistic cognizance of your organizational constitution.³⁵ *If TFI has been perceived as failing at any particular locale, the author attributes this failure to an inchoate process of educating leaders about the intricacies of TFI before placing them in this domain.* This holds true for both the Active Duty and AFRC. At the heart of this lie the cultural cornerstones that distinguish the subtleties of each organization. The vast preponderance of reservists was previously Active Duty.³⁶ Generally, reservists understand the Active Duty paradigm, although it has shifted incessantly during the last two decades. However, very few Active Duty officers have been members of the ARC, and this can correlate to (not implied causality) a lack of understanding of the ARC's culture, directives, and *modus operandi*. This fundamental premise can often lead to biases and assumptions that preclude accurate TFI decisions.

One facet of addressing this shortfall is through formalized education, and not merely learning on the job. Ill-prepared leaders who learn on the job can succeed, but the Air Force and AFRC would be best served by objectively educating these individuals prior to their tenure in associations. Ill-prepared leaders can inadvertently erode organizational trust and detrimentally affect command climate, which takes significant time to be reinvigorated at an organizational level.³⁷ In essence, education should at a minimum aid all TFI participants in finding an operational *modus Vivendi*.³⁸ Air Force TFI leadership needs to remember Thomas Jefferson's profound statement, "every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle," and reconcile differences to

accomplish the mission.³⁹ Leadership and education are the bricks and mortar that will hold the operation together.

Education's ability to affect and transform organizational cultures is not immediate. There is an acknowledged dilatory temporal aspect. Cultural change is generally gradual, subtle, iterative, and incremental.⁴⁰ However, due to the fact that two cultures (Active Air Force and Air Force Reserve) are already cohabitating and executing a mission, it is absolutely imperative to give them educational requisites for success. An Air University 2008 paper, *Guilt by Association; A Blending of Air Force Cultures*, written from an Active Duty perspective clearly identifies the cultural premise behind these organizational undercurrents in conflict; however, the paper offers little *remedy for resolving* Air Force cultural conflict without transitioning to a full-time equivalent (FTE) force.⁴¹ A FTE force abandons the essence of AFRC utilization and is not a cost effective alternative aligned with current OSD guidance.

By starting from a simple business analogy of a merger or an acquisition, one can immediately see the exigency of calling for education, and the importance of culture. Corporate mergers that succeed incorporate comprehensive education about intricacies of operating within each company's culture and organizational structure.⁴² Acquisitions on the other hand, often times manifest as coercive, and immediately affect personnel's attitude, especially if jobs are to be lost. According to an ATKearney research study, "in many mergers the more powerful partner imposes his culture on the less powerful one. This is done without any evaluation [of] which culture would be the more suitable one for the new organization."⁴³ This implies that it is likely that active associations and classic associations might have mirror-image issues. Micro-cultures

will have a propensity to blame organizational hierarchy (in this particular case, MAJCOMs). Is TFI not the military's version of a merger? More importantly, merging cultures is mathematically an uphill battle:

Statistics show 66 per cent of organizational transitions fail, very often because top management focuses on 'the deal'. Executives who provide insufficient attention to the cultural compatibility of a post-merger environment run the risk of losing staff and business momentum.⁴⁴

In context, TFI involves more than just putting the correct ingredients together, and hoping that the recipe succeeds. Mathematically, the odds are against it. TFI requires leadership who recognize the holistic involvement of multiple parts, and how to correctly influence their interaction. There are various strata of TFI. AFRC needs to have a bottom up perspective, evaluating the success of TFI from the systemic perceptions of its empowered wing commanders, not by merely analyzing metrics.⁴⁵ The qualitative assessments of AFRC's leaders are more insightful than numerical metrics.

Peter Senge advocates creating "learning-oriented cultures" as a vehicle to enable culture to be resilient, flexible, and adaptable to changing environmental stimuli.⁴⁶ This learning culture needs to permeate the collective masses that constitute the organization's culture and be all-encompassing. This too is a bottom up approach that will enable AFRC to develop another generation of TFI savvy leaders. Aligned with General Stenner's previous comments, AFRC needs to foster an "adaptive culture" in order to meet the impending transformational change requirements and to develop organizational "leadership and lifelong learning" to succeed.⁴⁷

In *Leading Change*, John Kotter emphasizes the importance of a learning culture: This means that over the next few decades we will see both a new form of organization emerge to cope with faster-moving and more competitive environments and a new kind of employee, at least in successful firms.⁴⁸

AFRC already encourages an environment of organizational learning. However, the message hasn't entirely permeated all of the organization's tentacles. For autonomous unit equipped (UE) AFRC operations, this might be tenable. However, when organizationally stagnant portions of AFRC marry into TFI, cultural stasis immediately becomes a formidable cultural obstacle to mission accomplishment. With that in mind, AFRC leadership must continue to send the same messages on professional education, adaption, and embracing challenges.⁴⁹ This learning vision needs to saturate AFRC.

Education: The Engine for Change

As previously described, education is a prerequisite for effective change through cultural mediums. TFI's largest shortfall hinges on inadequate cultural TFI-related education. *Air Force Instruction 90-1001: Responsibilities for Total Force Integration* makes a reference to educational requirements associated with TFI, and cross-references *Air Force Instruction 16-501, Control and Documentation of Air Force Programs*.⁵⁰ Specific TFI education is never mentioned in AFI 16-501, indicating an educational requirement that hasn't been adequately addressed.⁵¹ There is no explanation as to why TFI education was omitted, other than an apparent assumption that the current ad hoc processes were adequate.

Additionally, TFI is a comprehensive miscegenation of officers and enlisted. The Air Force Chief of Staff endorses the Air Force's 504-page *Professional Development Guide*, which is primarily focused at Air Force enlisted members.⁵² However, there is no specific reference to TFI, although there are nominal references to "Total Force."⁵³ This document allocates one page to cover a simplified explanation of the Air Reserve Component (ARC); although it doesn't comprehensively explain the details that Active Duty enlisted members will require in TFI wings, especially as senior noncommissioned

officers.⁵⁴ Without education, acculturation will likely be impeded due to a lack of understanding, biases, and false assumptions. Thus, not only is there a shortfall in properly educating officer leadership on the nuances of TFI, there is also an identified requirement to educate enlisted members before they are employed at TFI wings. This ad hoc approach to education presents too many opportunities for false information, cognitive biases, and cognitive dissonance to negatively affect an objective learning process that will directly contribute to improved operations for TFI.

In 2008, General Looney, Commander of Air Education and Training Command (AETC) authored a white paper entitled *On Learning: The Future of Air Force Education and Training*.⁵⁵ This white paper was accurate and comprehensive, although it didn't address the domain of TFI and the importance of education tailored to TFI operations. General Looney stated two key assumptions: first, "The Air Force will innovate and change its approach to education and training to effectively prepare future Airmen to perform successfully;" and second, "...approaches to education and training will account for...the future environment in which Airmen operate."⁵⁶ From a Total Force perspective, two important points manifest: The Air Force intends to utilize education to optimize performance, and they will do so based on their anticipated operational environment. That being so, why did AETC not recognize the (TFI) associations that define significant portions of its *current* and future environment?

Referencing previous CJCS guidance promulgated in 2005 by General Peter Pace, the term "total force" is not mentioned.⁵⁷ Granted, the Chairman's focus was "to develop a strategic plan for joint officer management and joint professional military education that links joint officer development to the overall missions and goals of the

Department of Defense.”⁵⁸ The previous Chairman’s white paper goes on to essentially formulate baseline U.S. policy on educating military’s members. This paper established a common thread of continuity that still is the baseline resonating throughout U.S. military education. The Chairman cogently recognized the importance of a continuum of education, especially via strategically minded, critical thinking, and jointly educated officers.⁵⁹ The integration of Reserve and National Guard complements is inadvertently omitted, perhaps due to the assumption that this integration was a refined process. However, General Pace did state that “the services maintain the responsibility to set and develop competencies to meet their own Service-specific roles, missions, and capabilities.”⁶⁰ With this in mind, the author advocates that the Air Force, integrated with AFRC, and perhaps the ANG, develop mutually beneficial TFI-related educational initiatives.

A merely cursory analysis of curricula instructed through most professional military education programs rather quickly reveals that Reserve subject matter is relatively short-sighted, and inadequate in terms of applicable utility. Curricula generally focus on comprehending the conceptual basis of our military’s Reserve components, without addressing the particular nuances that our leaders will be required to understand, command, lead, and implement in today’s Total Force Enterprise. Although the various branches of the military tailor the curricula slightly differently, all branches of the military would be best served by incorporating this as a fundamental premise.

For instance, Chairman of the *Joint Chief of Staff Instruction 1800.01D: Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)*, 15 July 2009, serves as the baseline instruction for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II.⁶¹ However, upon

referencing the syllabi that deal with the Reserve components, there are few learning objectives that correspond to actual oversight and leadership function fusing the Active and Reserve components of our military. In order to best prepare Active Duty and Reserve officers for the leadership positions they will encumber in the ever-growing domain of TFI and associations, revision of curricula and syllabi to reflect current shortfalls is paramount.

Joint Chief of Staff Instruction 1800.01D recognizes the importance of the Total Force, by stating that “The success of PME relies on leadership's ability to...ensure that proper attention is given to total force requirements relative to PME.”⁶² “JPME should position an officer to recognize and operate in tactical, operational, and strategic levels of national security, enhancing the total force capability and capacity to wage, as necessary, traditional and irregular warfare.”⁶³ The Instruction goes on to state, “The twenty-first century total force must train [and be educated] to adaptability, agility, and relevance.”⁶⁴ However, beyond this stated guidance, there is a perceived gap between the theory of total force education and designing, implementing, and utilizing total force education to improve organizational efficiencies. This gap manifests in TFI.

It is here that the focus will be refined from the joint level to the Air Force, AFRC, and Air University. Potential subject matter to be incorporated by Air University must be closely vetted by experienced senior leaders from AFRC and the Active Duty Air Force. Ideally these members would have experience under the crucible of an associate unit, on either side of the equation, be it an active or classic associate unit. Determining the exact curriculum or curricula will best be determined via a cadre of experienced Active

Duty and ARC associate commanders from the squadron all the way to MAJCOM levels.

The skeleton for this education would probably be via the premise of literally covering all of AFI 90-1001 and its glossary. Comprehending the legal constitution of Air Reserve Technicians is fundamental. How Air Reserve Technicians' (ART) pay status affects signatory hierarchies needs to be understood. Civilian pay pool management, as well as the National Security Personnel System (NSPS), and General Schedule (GS) differences are integral to the daily vernacular. All parties need to know the following baseline nomenclature: Additional Flying Training Period (AFTP), Additional Ground Training Period (AGTP), Unit Training Assembly (UTA), Military Personnel Appropriation (MPA), Reserve Personnel Appropriation (RPA), I-Plans, Uniformed Service Employment and Reemployment Act (USERRA), Employee Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR), and the differences between Title 10, 5, and 32. These topics are simply the tip of the iceberg, but they are also demonstrative of the jargon that defines a similar-but notably different-culture. The aforementioned subject matter forms the cultural foundation that distinguishes reservists from their Active Duty counterparts. Leaders must strive for true understanding of the lifestyle and culture associated with multiple employers with competing interests, and possibly commuting to one job. Seemingly tactical or operational in nature, a cumulative crescendo of misunderstandings can quickly imperil AFRC and Air Force leaders in strategic quagmires.⁶⁵

Successful completion of all Senior Developmental Education (SDE) in-residence courses will grant attendees JPME Phase II credit according to *Joint Chief of Staff*

*Instruction 1800.01D.*⁶⁶ Yet, the curricula are different among the senior service schools. The differences among curricula manifest the ability to change certain portions of what the schools are teaching, while still satisfying the requisites associated with the JPME Phase II credit. This means that the schools have the option to tailor certain curricula and syllabi to accommodate their service-specific needs, or the needs that they feel provide the most relevant leverage to their students, in conjunction with their follow-on assignments, especially regarding electives.

One possible remedy to address the shortfalls of TFI related education would be to develop electives that detail the operational leadership challenges associated with the marriage of Active and Reserve components.⁶⁷ This class would need to go beyond the conceptual level cognizance of TFI, and permeate down to the previously described level of details associated with operational oversight. It is ironic that in order to have the intended strategic affect on the parent organizations, the course will need to get into the operational and tactical level nuances of each culture. However, without this level of intricate detail, leaders will probably be ill-equipped to deal with some of the unique challenges of TFI associations.

A natural segue is to require that certain jobs have a particular schooling prerequisite. For instance, joint billets will usually require students to attend joint schooling prior to filling the billet.⁶⁸ Along these same lines, it would be wise to send those officers-both Active Duty and Reserve-who will be filling leadership positions in our Associate units through a course that covers subject matter related to the TFI. This course could either be incorporated into the developmental education (DE) of the respective service, or it could be an abbreviated course that focuses on subject matter

to which this paper alludes. The requirement is absolutely imperative as an underpinning to success in the TFI realm. The choice of incorporating the subject matter into all DE or into a focused course should be levied upon the Air University faculty, AFRC, ANG, and AF senior leaders to discuss at CORONA.⁶⁹ Hence, the subject matter of this paper can be levied as a proposed CORONA topic from AFRC.

In synopsis of the topic of TFI-related education, this paper has clearly identified a shortfall. There are instances where TFI might have succeeded in lieu of this education. However, these TFI occurrences are probably aberrational. The need for education is dictated by national level guidance. The imperative for TFI education is driven by operational exigencies at certain wings. The focus of TFI education should be through a foundation of AFI 90-1001. Cultural understanding and leadership will underpin TFI success through education.⁷⁰ AFRC needs to champion this educational imperative and discuss its importance with Active Duty and ARC leadership. There is a spectrum of possible remedies ranging from education crafted specifically for squadron, group, wing, and MAJCOM leadership to incorporating TFI education into various PME syllabi. The TFI relationship is symbiotic between the ARC and the Active Duty. There should thus be an understanding of a need to mutually reciprocate contributions. If not endorsed by other TFI contributors, AFRC should still develop their own TFI programs tailored commensurate with leadership responsibilities.

Career Cross-Pollination

Forged on the premise that TFI is innate to future Air Force modus operandi, career management needs to fuse both enterprises together when it can. In order to optimize the human and intellectual capital of AFRC and Air Force enterprises, sagacious personnel placement is another pillar for success. Headquarters AFRC has

an eclectic assortment of Active Duty Air Force officers integrated into many key positions at the colonel and strategic leader levels. Although AFRC cannot compel Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) into selecting certain officers to come to these positions, it behooves AFRC to shape and influence these decisions so that the officers who fill these billets are able to repopulate back into the Active Duty Air Force with requisite comprehensive knowledge of AFRC culture and job-related acumen. To effectively perpetuate a climate of cultural understanding there will have to be multiple iterations of repopulating these hybrid senior leaders between each organization in order to adequately “mentally program” the leadership.⁷¹ Based on recent history, it will be an uphill battle. The last three AFRC A3 Combat Air Force (CAF) Assistant Director of Operations (ADO) (Active Duty colonels) have retired in their billets, and moved into General Schedule (GS) or contractor positions at AFRC.⁷² The last three AFRC A3 training division chiefs (Active Duty colonels) have retired in the position.⁷³ Although this is the individual’s prerogative, it is generally indicative of the fact that these Active Duty colonels have realized that their career progression was slowed upon their arrival to HQ AFRC. A possible interpretation of this and the subtle message to AFRC Action Officers (AOs) is that the Active Duty wasn’t fully committed to TFI. Regardless, this affected cultural perceptions and never allowed either organization to get a subsequent return on investment through career cross-pollination.

Ideally these individuals would be able to take their experience at AFRC and propagate back into the domain of associate units with increased leadership efficacy due to understanding the unique lifestyle of the citizen-airmen. The same holds true for AFRC personnel operating in active associations. Ideally AFRC personnel in active

associations will subsequently be placed in career positions that capitalize on their previous active experience and fuse that into a requirement. After this interim job, as well as requisite DE, these individuals could migrate into classic associations, and have a relatively comprehensive understanding of both sides of the TFI equation. This implies selective personnel placements by both the Air Force and AFRC, and is something that has yet to be implemented. Synergies can further be leveraged by coupling this personnel reciprocation with tailored education. AFRC is on the vanguard of researching, and enacting such a personnel system, although the focus and the intent of the program is primarily aimed at career development than at the TFI facet. With that being said, the tenet of TFI experience will inherently prove complementary to career development and must be integrated into the process.

Career broadening assignments should undergo evaluation to ensure that they are no longer vestigial and based on an obsolete paradigm of career progression. Both AFRC and the Active Duty need to revisit their current templates on career progression. Even military career paradigms will experience significant and multiple metamorphoses of sorts during the span of the next 20-30 years, accelerated through technological advancements. Requisite career “hurdles” should be validated to make certain that they actually are contributory to officer development. Most importantly, progression guidance needs to anticipate changes in the organizational mission to best position “high potential officers” for subsequent career responsibilities.⁷⁴ Moving officers through space and cyber tours, as well as the education that they will receive, will enable a larger portion of the force to evolve commensurately with technological propagation into these domains. Pilots prove unique, due to the substantial monetary investment

associated with their initial training. However, in order to reach the pinnacle of the “career pyramid,” a fundamental understanding and fluency in the Air, Space, and Cyber domains is quintessential for Active Duty and Reserve officers.⁷⁵

Since AFRC inherits a large portion of the Active Duty Air Force, this argument also applies to AFRC. More than likely, AFRC aircrew members will propagate from piloting into these emerging domains as a one-way street due to the longevity of their careers. However, balanced with rated requirements, the Active Duty should definitely consider integrating UAS, space, and cyber tours for pilots, high potential officers, and enlisted members, after resolving current manning shortfalls. U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT) Commander, Lieutenant General David Goldfein, recognized the importance of this and lead by example by getting checked out in the MQ-9 (Reaper) while at ACC.⁷⁶

Continuum of Service

In light of recent “Defense Budgetary Review Board” comments on issues associated with the military pay and retirement system, the continuum of service is an extremely relevant subject.⁷⁷ Again we see the need for AFRC and the Active Duty Air Force, Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC), and Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) to mutually address this subject. Regardless of the motivation, as Active Duty members leave the Air Force, all parties would be best served by at least a partial retention of these members’ abilities and skill sets. In the interest of stewardship, programs like Palace Chase and Palace Front should be aggressively pursued, and all Active Duty separations should be accurately and aggressively funneled to accessions of the ARC via ARPC.⁷⁸ However, current focus on the concept of continuum of service is actually

somewhat myopic and doesn't account for the broader DOD Policy Directive 1200.17 definition:

Management policies supported by appropriate statutes, benefit and compensation options and agreements that facilitate transparent movement, to the extent possible, of individuals *between active military, Reserve military and civilian service*. These management policies provide variable and flexible service options and levels of participation, and are consistent with DoD manpower requirements and each individual's ability to serve over the course of a *lifetime of service*.⁷⁹

Lt Col Robert Wiley of the U.S. Army Reserve authored an award winning paper at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) in 2011 that discussed avant-garde approaches to utilizing this broader definition of continuum of service to optimize army human capital.⁸⁰ Echoing Wiley's insights, and paralleling General Stenner's leadership, The Chief of the Army Reserve, Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, is emphasizing the continuum of service as a means for the Army to optimize its human capital.⁸¹ Due to impending fiscal austerity, the Air Force, and AFRC as a subset, should discuss entertaining new ways to utilize the continuum of service. This might entail reevaluating and redefining personnel management to allow a seamless transition between the Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve components, as well as into civilian and government sectors. Ultimately, the continuum of service is a broad based manifestation of TFI on the grandest scale.

As the Air, Space, and Cyber domains, nomenclature, taxonomy, and vernacular evolve, the Air Force and AFRC should endeavor to create polyglots of Air, Space, and Cyber. The Air Force and AFRC will need leaders with an eclectic background who are fluent in multiple weapons systems, missions, and domains. Just as the military has properly focused initiatives aimed at developing linguistics skills, as demonstrated by the Strategic Language Lists, so too must they focus on the other tenants of "cross-

culturally savvy” leadership.⁸² Often times, reservists have developed a repertoire of abilities in their civilian career fields that may directly translate to their military career. Is this not what the broad based intent of *DOD Directive 1200.17* intended? For instance, AFRC has employees who are about to interview for Senior Executive Service (SES) positions in their civilian careers. As reservists, these individuals may be employed in completely disparate capacities. It behooves the military to allow and encourage these individuals to flow into domains such as AFCYBER if required, and to consider accepting their civilian bona fide professional certifications and qualifications in lieu of Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) mandates. Although unconventionally aligned with existing assignment processes, this manner abandons archaic processes and exploits capabilities, providing leverage. Fiscal austerity will demand organizational resiliency.

Along the same lines as the generalized concept of the continuum of service are intra-service component concepts of transportability, interoperability, and interchangeability. AFRC had previously endorsed a transportability of service, encouraging placement of the correct individual in the correct position, regardless of pay status. Yet, AFRC hasn’t entirely followed through on this endeavor, often falling victim to its own bureaucratic restrictions attached to unit manning documents (UMD). Transportability means that AFRC members would be able to transfer positions, regardless of the position’s current pay status, and put the correct person in the job.

Visionaries & Leadership: The Enablers of Transformation

Based on all of the discussed challenges, AFRC should ask itself what type of leaders it will require to oversee, evolve, and synchronize these initiatives. Before embarking on organizational transformation, AFRC needs to reevaluate its position in the ever-dynamic American military and fiscal environments. As Secretaries Gates’ and

Panetta's comments emphasize, the exigency requiring change is driven by the broader fiscal environment. AFRC leadership needs to continue to develop leaders who have Clausewitz's visionary *coup d'oeil* and are "cross-cultural savvy."⁸³ These "metacompetencies" will facilitate AFRC's organizational alignment commensurate with the dynamics of both the external and internal environments and enable exploitations of asymmetric advantages and niches.⁸⁴ These two competencies are thus *sine qua non*, essential and indispensable traits to optimize the transformational process and to ensure that AFRC has created a legacy of visionary future leaders.

In his section on military genius, Clausewitz defines the French term *coup d'oeil* as, "the quick recognition of truth that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection."⁸⁵ This keen trait could almost be deemed "interactive clairvoyance," which goes beyond the ability to merely see the future, but to also decisively influence, shape, and affect it. William Duggan deems it, "Strategic Intuition."⁸⁶ It alludes to getting inside the enemy's decision cycles and expediting through the Boyd's OODA loop.⁸⁷ AFRC will need to instill this brilliant perspective from the ground up to cultivate a capable harvest of visionary leaders. At the top of the command pyramid, this ability is essentially command clairvoyance.

In a contemporary sense *coup d'oeil* is a grand vision, and the capability to conceptualize how the dynamic interaction of multiple, competing systems will likely play out.⁸⁸ The focus for AFRC is more on TFI and the budgetary battlefields. Leaders will need the acumen to discern quickly and clearly how to exploit this vision into a competitive advantage that will play out both on the battlefield, or in Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process (PPBE). This visionary capability to

see, shape, and influence the future is a comprehensive leadership trait that AFRC needs to instill in its A5A8 (strategic plans, requirements, and programming) personnel, as well as in a Strategic Initiatives Group (SIG).⁸⁹ AFRC needs leaders capable of Jonathon Swift's insight, "Vision is the art of seeing the invisible."⁹⁰ The invisible is arguably the future operating environment, and the correct force posturing with the Air Force is existentially important to AFRC. Part of seeing the vision is the ability to listen to inputs from the conglomerate of wing leadership and to synthesize data to information to actionable knowledge aligned with the dynamic environment.

Great organizational leaders, especially those who transform their organizations, possess an innate ability to perceive subtleties as manifestations of trends of both the internal and external environments. The budgetary and fiscal trends are producing cues that are no longer subtle. Impending fiscal austerity is obvious. AFRC leaders need to demonstrate *coup d'oeil* by assessing environmental trends, extrapolating a vector, and implementing prescient change catalysts.

Strategic leaders have to rely on *savoir faire* in order to charismatically galvanize the organization to transform itself. This is not an easy task; there are no recipes for success. Each situation is unique—especially when the AFI regarding TFI explains that TFI will be different for each wing and weapons system. The onus of institutionalizing the change permeates through wing, group, and squadron leadership. The best strategic leaders find ways to utilize cultural and emotional inertia to their advantage. For instance, Louis Gerstner Jr. completely revitalized IBM and stated, "Management doesn't change culture. Management invites the workforce itself to change the culture."⁹¹ Just like Kung Fu practitioners find ways to redirect energy and momentum,

so too do effective strategic leaders. They set processes in motion with efficient use of effort. TFI has succeeded to varying degrees, usually hinging on the efforts of local leadership. One leader can make or break TFI at the wing level. AFRC must choose its leadership wisely because this key TFI juncture will define AFRC for the next decade.

Leaders with *coup d'oeil* are great at recognizing emerging events in their nascent stages. Beyond that, they are great at prioritizing relevant correlations into something meaningful. Peter Schwartz defines “predetermined events” as “forces that we can anticipate with certainty because we already see their early stages in the world today. We know they are inevitable because they have already begun to take place.”⁹²

In this particular case (FY2012), consider impending fiscal austerity. Schwartz goes on to describe individuals that are intimately attuned to their internal and external environment that makes them extremely adroit when compared to their competitors. These individuals are able to take on more risk because of their great environmental research and understanding how they can interact with the ecosystem. By taking on more mitigated risk, these organizations and individuals obtain greater rewards due to their intimate understanding of their operational domain. Leaders must remain engaged because AFRC’s TFI relationships are ever-changing to reflect Active Duty mission demands and personnel cycles.

It is the *coup d'oeil*, in conjunction with steadfast and diligent attention to the environment, which will enable AFRC leaders to make important risk balancing decisions about TFI. More importantly, the more AFRC leaders practice environmental scanning and futuring, the more likely that they will develop and refine their *coup d'oeil*. This requires educating and entrusting a broader cadre of AFRC leaders within the

strategic realm of the enterprise. The next generation of AFRC leaders will only develop these distinct capabilities if they are appropriately educated, entrusted, and empowered to utilize them in their current capacity.

The effectiveness of *coup d'oeil* is in turn amplified by the ability to discern, comprehend, and exploit multiple operating environments and domains. Hence, true leverage and synergy for leaders with *coup d'oeil* is multiplied by leaders who are cross-culturally savvy.⁹³ Cross-culturally savvy leaders are capable of understanding a multitude of different cultures, systems, and organizations; these are the future leaders and polyglots of air, space, and cyber. TFI and the fiscal environment inherently create amalgams of multiple cultures, many of which are in incipient stages themselves.⁹⁴ As fiscal reality inevitably shrinks the military and brings cultures closer together through TFI, it is absolutely imperative that AFRC strategic leaders consider ramifications from compressed cultural interaction. Emerging operational domains and missions like space, cyber, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), air operations centers (AOCs), and contingency response groups (CRG) are driving an interconnectedness and interdependency among military cultures which might otherwise have chosen not to interact.⁹⁵ Thus, just as these trends can spawn productive cultural phenomena, they can also breed unintentional inter-service mission and budgetary conflicts.

With that in mind, AFRC has some key questions it needs to ask itself in order to reevaluate its vision for the dynamics of the 21st century: How can we optimize our TFI relationships? Does professional military education (PME) accurately portray our role in accomplishing the mission, and are individuals adequately informed about the unique challenges of leading TFI wings? What missions and what locations are conducive to

the ARC? Is organizational expansion and parochialism in the best interest of the nation? How should AFRC proactively engage with the Active Duty Air Force to influence and shape CAF Fleet recapitalization and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) integration? Is there a need for legislation that enables greater Reserve utilization through greater legislated protection? What is the optimal mobilization to dwell ratios under the current paradigm? What are the long term ramifications on retention if deployment becomes an incessant perpetuity? Can AFRC sustain an operationally strategic Reserve, or will the utilization of the operational Reserve cannibalize the strategic Reserve? These questions are clearly rhetorical in nature. However, the commonality they share is that they all pivot upon the fulcrum of interpreting the future, and they all affect the long term viability of AFRC.

A Strategic Initiative Group

All of the previous questions are inherently strategic in nature, and although the organization does have a strategic planning directorate, the author endorses the creation of an independent *Strategic Initiative Group (SIG)*, comprised of intellectually diverse visionary individuals that are schooled in strategic analysis and critical thinking. Based on fiscal reality, this group could be constituted “out of hide.” A cadre of skilled individuals within the SIG is a requisite, and further points to the absolute importance of career development, education, mentoring, and strategic leadership fostering within the AFRC community. More than anything else, this very subject matter accentuates the need to nurture strategic level thinkers and leaders on par with Active Duty Air Force. AFRC evolution into force management, force development, and education is on the right track. However, there are a few areas that have yet to be adequately developed.

Conclusion

Organizational alignment is absolutely imperative for organizations during times of a decreasing budget.^{96,97} AFRC needs to scan its internal and external environment, envision multiple futures, and ponder how the organization can proactively adapt to the changing environment in a manner which provides a sustainable and unique competitive advantage to U.S. taxpayers. In essence, AFRC needs to find niche markets in which its personnel composition is uniquely suited, and can exploit its asymmetric capabilities. In so doing, AFRC will optimize its contributions to the National Military Strategy of the United States.

In synopsis, the best things that AFRC can do is to focus on influencing and crafting transformational change on the items that will have the most leveraged contributions to operations. The author asserts that culturally educating all facets of TFI will optimize the total force and yield the most marginal utility. There are a multitude of potential options for actually implementing TFI-related education and the intention of this paper has been predominantly focused on identifying this shortfall and discussing conceptually based solutions that adhere to doctrinal guidance. Hence, this paper should serve as a stimulant for discussion for senior Air Force and ARC leaders who can subsequently refine courses of action. As the primary resonating frequency, TFI-related education can be melodically complemented by reevaluating other “harmonics” such as career cross-pollination, the continuum of service, transportability of service, and developing leaders who have *coup d'oeil* and are cross-culturally savvy in the broadest sense.⁹⁸

Melding all of the above indicates that AFRC could also be well served by creating a strategic initiative group of leaders who could independently ratiocinate on

potential strategic issues independent of existing organizational structure, duties, and process. Above all else, this paper is not prescriptive; rather it can be utilized by AFRC leadership who can subsequently “target and sort” according to their execution matrix, vision, and timeline.⁹⁹ The ultimate goal is the longevity and prosperity of AFRC as a solid contributor to the Air Force and the defense of the United States. Winston Churchill, one of the world’s greatest visionary leaders, stated, “The empires of the future will be empires of the mind.”¹⁰⁰ It is incumbent upon AFRC leadership to embrace such a vision as it envisions and determines its own future.

Endnotes

¹ GEN Martin Dempsey, lecture, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, August 18, 2011, cited with permission of Gen Dempsey.

² John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 1996), 35, 45.

³ *Part II: Trends Influencing the World’s Security; The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010.* (U.S. Joint Forces Command, February 2010). From *Strategic Leadership Selected Readings AY2012*, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2011).

⁴ Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed., (New York, NY: Longman, 1999), 144.

⁵ Bureaucratic inertia is defined as: a common term in the study of government and public administration; bureaucratic inertia is often used in a derogatory sense to refer to the slow pace of large and highly complex organizations (bureaucracies) in accomplishing their tasks. While sometimes organizations suffer from bureaucratic inertia because of workers' low productivity, bureaucratic inertia more often than not results from the many rules, regulations, policies, and procedures that public and governmental organizations legally have to follow. M. Boyer, (Connecticut, The University of Connecticut, 2001) <http://spirit.lib.uconn.edu/~mboyer/ms2001-02glossary.html> (accessed October 3, 2011).

⁶ For a relevant example of the U.S. Air Force fundamentally designing its force structure in relation to the end of the Cold War and overcoming bureaucratic inertia, see John Piazza and Leland A. Russell, “Leadership Lessons for Overwhelming Bureaucratic Inertia” (GEO Group Strategic Services, Inc., 2010) http://www.geogroup.net/articles/3_6leadership_lessons_for_overwhelming_bureaucratic_inertia.html (accessed October 3, 2011).

⁷ Stephen J. Gerras, *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 3rd edition, ed. Stephen J. Gerras (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2010), 20-25.

⁸ Michael G. Mullen, *The National Military Strategy of The United States of America 2011: Redefining America's Military Leadership* (Washington, DC: The Chairman U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 8, 2011), 9.

⁹ U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, quoted by Jim Garamone, “Gates Puts Meat on Bones of Department Efficiencies Initiatives,” August 9, 2010, *U.S. Department of Defense News*, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=60348> (accessed October 7, 2011).

¹⁰ The phrase “Total Force” is utilized 23 times in this memorandum, including in recommended solutions. For more details, see: U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “The Recommendations of the Commissions on the National Guard and Reserves,” memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Washington, DC, November 24, 2008. Linked from http://www.militarytimes.com/static/projects/pages/112508_gates_memo.pdf (accessed October 7, 2011).

¹¹ Robert M. Gates, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010), http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf (accessed October 7, 2011), i.

¹² Leon Panetta, quoted in Donna Cassata, “Panetta Faces Lawmakers on Defense Cuts,” October 13, 2011 <http://news.yahoo.com/panetta-faces-lawmakers-defense-cuts-070428724.html> (accessed October 15, 2011).

¹³ Additionally, the USAF’s initially stated (since revised) five priorities are: 1) Strengthening the nuclear enterprise; 2) Partnering with joint and coalition teams; 3) Caring for families; 4) Modernization; 5) Improving acquisition performance. Block quotation reference: Norton A. Schwartz, *The Way Ahead: CSAF’s Vector* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Air Force, July 4, 2010). <http://www.af.mil/information/viewpoints/csaf.asp?id=603> (accessed October 7, 2011)

¹⁴ Norton A. Schwartz, *CSAF Vector 2011* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Air Force, July 4, 2011). <http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110703-001.pdf> (accessed October 7, 2011)

¹⁵ Charles Stenner, speaking to 919 Special Operations Wing, Duke Field, Florida, quoted in Samuel King Jr., “AF Reserve Leader Addresses Citizen Commandos,” October 13, 2011, <http://www.afrc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123275693> (accessed October 16, 2011).

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Harry Schonau, “*TFI-Way Ahead-Vision-Status-Future*,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Robins Air Force Base, GA, HQ AFRC, February 4, 2011, http://www.loanational.org/_files/briefings/2011/3b%20-%20Harry%20Schonau%20-%20AFRC%20TFI%20Briefing.pdf (accessed October 7, 2011).

¹⁸ John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 1996) 33-85.

¹⁹ The Secretary of the Air Force, *Responsibilities for Total Force Integration: Air Force Instruction 90-1001*; Change 1 Incorporated (Washington, DC; U.S. Department of the Air Force, April 25, 2008) <http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFI90-1001.pdf> (accessed September 1, 2011), 4-5.

²⁰ Ibid., 4-7.

²¹ Ibid., 5.

²² Author's intent is to emphasize this sentence.

²³ Ibid., 4-5.

²⁴ Brian D. Moore, "Fighter Maintenance and Total Force Integration: Current Active duty Manpower Implementation Practices and the Impact on Deployment Capability" (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, April 2009), <http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada540126.pdf> (accessed October 7, 2011), 1-22.

²⁵ For instance, F-16 crew ratios are at 1.25. A-10 crew ratios were at 1.5, but are currently being reduced to 1.25, creating conflict. Brian Vandiviere, AFRC/A3T, CAF Branch Chief, telephonic interview by author, October 3, 2011.

²⁶ Michael B. Donley and Norton A. Schwartz, *Presentation to the Committee on Armed Services United States House of Representatives; Fiscal Year 2012 Air Force Posture Statement*, Posture Statement presented to Congress. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Air Force, February 17, 2011), 1-29.

²⁷ Brian Vandiviere, AFRC/A3T, CAF Branch Chief, telephonic interview by author, October 3, 2011.

²⁸ Randall Cason, AFRC/A3T, CAF Branch Chief, telephonic interview by author, October 15, 2011.

²⁹ Brian D. Moore, "Fighter Maintenance and Total Force Integration: Current Active duty Manpower Implementation Practices and the Impact on Deployment Capability" (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, April 2009), <http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada540126.pdf> (accessed October 7, 2011), 1-22.

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³⁶ Douglas Miller, AFRC/A3T, Aircrew Rated Management, telephonic interview by author, October 3, 2011.

³⁷ Steven M. Jones, “*Improving Accountability for Effective Command Climate: A Strategic Imperative*” in *Strategic Studies Institute Monograph* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, September, 2003). <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub248.pdf> (accessed October 3, 2011), 1-6.

³⁸ *Modus Vivendi* is a Latin phrase that means that although parties may recognize disagreement, they still have controlled their differences of opinion and will operate effectively with their opinions put aside. It literally means “mode of living,” but implies mutual and diplomatically accommodating principles. This is actually a realistic interim goal for certain venues of TFI.

³⁹ Thomas Jefferson, Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801.

⁴⁰ Richard D. Lewis, *When Cultures Collide: Leading Across Cultures*, 3rd Edition (Boston, MA: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2006), 125-128.

⁴¹ Mark Sotallaro, *Guilt by Association; A Blending of Air Force Cultures*, (Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, April 2008), 1-33.

⁴² Wharton School of Business, “*Corporate Culture Can Break (or Make) a Merger,*” September 26, 2001, <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/articlepdf/429.pdf?CFID=161348500&CFTOKEN=88929246&jsessionid=a83023ab8f505df64d735a4014491e7d5df6> (accessed October 8, 2011)

⁴³ Oliver Recklies, “Mergers and Corporate Culture.”

⁴⁴ Jacqueline Allen, “How to Adjust to a New Corporate Culture After a Merger,” <http://www.allbusiness.com/management/873043-1.html> (accessed October 8, 2011).

⁴⁵ Author’s intent is to emphasize this sentence.

⁴⁶ Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline; The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization* (New York, NY: Currency Doubleday, 2006), 272.

⁴⁷ John P. Kotter, *Leading Change*, 170, 175.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 175.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 85.

⁵⁰ The Secretary of the Air Force, *Responsibilities for Total Force Integration: Air Force Instruction 90-1001; Change 1 Incorporated*, 1-70.

⁵¹ The Secretary of the Air Force, *Control and Documentation of Air Force Programs: Air Force Instruction 16-501* (Washington, DC; U.S. Department of the Air Force, August 15, 2006) <http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFI16-501.pdf> (accessed September 1, 2011), 1-38.

⁵² The Secretary of the Air Force, Professional Development Guide: Air Force Pamphlet 36-2241 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Air Force, July 1 2009) <http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFPAM36-2241.pdf> (accessed September 1, 2011), 1-504.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 72.

⁵⁵ William Looney III, General, Commander, Air Education and Training Command. On Learning The Future of Air Force Education and Training. Linked from <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/aetc/afd-080130-066.pdf> (accessed September 1, 2011), 1-29.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 5.

⁵⁷ Peter Pace, Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, November, 2005) http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/education/officer_JPME/cjcsvision_jod.pdf (accessed August 22, 2011) pp iv-10.

⁵⁸ Ibid., iv.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 3.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 9.

⁶¹ The Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *1800.01D: Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)* (Washington, DC; U.S. Department of the Air Force, July 15, 2009) http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/1800_01.pdf (accessed August 22, 2011) pp 1-GL-10.

⁶² Ibid., D-2.

⁶³ Ibid., 3.

⁶⁴ Ibid., A-2. Content Note: Brackets [] are from the original citation, not added by author.

⁶⁵ Author's intent is to emphasize this sentence.

⁶⁶ Ibid., A-B-1.

⁶⁷ Content note: Electives are listed in two places in the USAWC Curriculum Catalogue; however, Reserve component subject matter isn't. For further details, see: Greg F. Martin, *Curriculum Catalogue: Resident Education Program Class of 2012; Distance Education Program Class of 2013* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2010), 24, 35.

⁶⁸ The Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *1800.01D: Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)*.

⁶⁹ CORONA [Top] “is one of the service’s tri-annual powwows of senior USAF generals from the unified combatant commands and the service’s own major commands. The uniformed leadership meets to discuss the major issues facing the service and plot future changes.” Adriane Craig, “Corona Top Underway,” June 10, 2010 link <http://www.airforce-magazine.com/DRArchive/Pages/2010/June%202010/June%202010%202010/CoronaTopUnderway.aspx> (accessed October 10, 2011)

⁷⁰ Author’s intent is to emphasize this sentence.

⁷¹ Geert Hofstede and Gert Jan Hofstede, “*The Rules of the Social Game*,” in *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind* (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2005), 166.

⁷² Brian Vandiviere, AFRC/A3T, CAF Branch Chief, telephonic interview by author, October 3, 2011.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ AFRC/A1K and ARPC/DPAS, “Air Force Reserve Force Management and Development (FMD),” March 2009, <http://www.arpc.afrc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070502-059.doc> (accessed October 15, 2011).

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ David Goldfein, “Lieutenant General David Goldfein; Official Biography,” September 2011, linked from *The Official Website of the U.S. Air Force*, <http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=9475> (accessed October 23, 2011)

⁷⁷ Defense Business Board, “Modernizing the Military Retirement System,” July 21, 2011, briefing slides http://dbb.defense.gov/pdf/DBB_Military_Retirement_Final_Presentationpdf.pdf (accessed October 15, 2011)

⁷⁸ The Secretary of the Air Force, *Applying for the Palace Chase and Palace Front Programs: Air Force Instruction 36-3205, with Interim Change IC-2* (Washington, DC; U.S. Department of the Air Force, November 12, 2009) <http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFI36-3205.pdf> (accessed October 8, 2011) 1-41.

⁷⁹ Robert M. Gates, Department of Defense Directive Number 1200.17, “*Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*,” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, October 29, 2008) <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/120017p.pdf> (accessed October 15, 2011), 8.

⁸⁰ Rob Wiley, *Avoiding a Hollow Force by Supporting the Continuum of Service Concept*, (Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, March 30, 2011) <http://www.usar.army.mil/arweb/Documents/Avoiding%20a%20Hollow%20Force%20by%20Supporting%20the%20Continuum%20of%20Service%20Concept.pdf> (accessed October 15, 2011).

⁸¹ Bill Ayers, interview by the author, Carlisle Barracks, PA, October 13, 2011.

⁸² “Cross-culturally savvy refers to more than just the ability to work with non-U.S. militaries. The metacompetency, cross-culturally savvy, includes the ability to understand cultures beyond one’s organizational, economic, religious, societal, geographical, and political boundaries. A strategic leader with cross-cultural savvy is comfortable interacting with and leading joint, international, interagency, or inter-organizational entities.” Stephen J. Gerras, *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 3rd edition, ed. Stephen J. Gerras (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2010), 63.

⁸³ Gerras, *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 63.

⁸⁴ Gerras, *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 61.

⁸⁵ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Indexed Edition, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1989), 102.

⁸⁶ For an expansive inquiry that shows a correlation between strategic intuition and “interactive clairvoyance” (my term), see: William Duggan, *Strategic Intuition: The Creative Spark in Human Intuition* (West Sussex, NY: Colombia Business School Publishing, 2007), 2, 55.

⁸⁷ The “OODA” Loop stands for observe, orient, decide, and act. It was developed by Col John Boyd to describe decision cycles during aviation combat but has sense been expanded to over many scenarios. See Chester W. Richards, *A Swift, Elusive Sword; What if Sun Tzu and John Boyd Did the National Defense Review?* (Center For Defense Information, February 2003, Vol 22). Linked from http://www.valuebasedmanagement.net/methods_boyd_ooda_loop.html (accessed September 15, 2011).

⁸⁸ Gerras, *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 23.

⁸⁹ AFRC is unique, because it has merged A5 and A8 into a synchronized directorate (A5A8) that melds planning with programming.

⁹⁰ Jonathon Swift.

⁹¹ Louis V. Gerstner, Jr. *Who Says Elephants Can’t Dance? Leading a Great Enterprise through Dramatic Change*. (New York, Harper Collins, 2003), 187.

⁹² Peter Schwartz, *Inevitable Surprises: Thinking Ahead in a Time of Turbulence* (New York, Gotham Books, 2003), 6.

⁹³ Gerras, *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 63.

⁹⁴ Richard D. Lewis, *When Cultures Collide: Leading Across Cultures*, 3rd Edition (Boston, MA: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2006), 47.

⁹⁵ Ibid, 142.

⁹⁶ Dr. Richard Meinhart, instructional comment based on his research, Carlisle Barracks, PA, October 6, 2011.

⁹⁷ Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed., (New York, NY: Longman, 1999),172.

⁹⁸ “Harmonic: any of a series of musical tones whose frequencies are integral multiples of the frequency of a fundamental tone.” See <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/harmonic> (accessed September 17, 2011).

⁹⁹ “Target and Sort” are terms out of the fighter pilot vernacular, brevity code that detail the allocation of radars for groups and intra-group respectively. Lt Col Thode, personal knowledge.

¹⁰⁰ Winston Churchill, Linked from <http://www.leadershipnow.com/visionquotes.html> (accessed September 29, 2011).